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ARGUMENT
I.
The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion When It Concluded That Dr.
Malpass's Proposed Testimony Would Not Assist The Trier Of Fact
A.

Introduction
The state has 'already briefed the issue of whether the district court

abused its discretion in holding that the proffered testimony of Dr. Malpass was
inadmissible on the basis that it would not assist the finder of fact.
(Respondent's brief, pp. 3-8.) Wright has submitted supplemental briefing in
which he expressly addresses the effect he believes the recent ldaho Supreme
Court decision in State v. Pearce, 146 ldaho 241, 192 P.3d 1065 (2008), should
have in this case. (Appellant's supplemental brief, pp. 3-8.)

Review of the

Pearce decision shows that it supports the conclusion that the district court did
not abuse its discretion in holding the proposed testimony inadmissible.
B.

The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion When It Held That The
Proposed Testimonv Bv Dr. Malpass Would Not Assist The Finder Of Fact
In Pearce the district court rejected certain proposed testimony by Dr.

Honts "regarding lineup procedures and resulting identifications in general,
finding he was not sufficiently qualified as an expert in this area, either as to his
background or his knowledge of the facts of Pearce's case." Pearce, 146 ldaho
at 244, 192 P.3d at 1068. The court reiterated that reversal of such a ruling was
appropriate only if there was an abuse of discretion, considering the three factors
of whether the trial court perceived the matter as an exercise of discretion, acted
within the boundaries of its discretion and consistently with applicable legal

standards, and reached its decision by exercise of reason. Pearce, 146 ldaho at
245, 192 P.3d at 1069.
The proper legal standard for admission of expert testimony is twofold:
first the court must determine if the person is qualified as an expert, and if the
proposed witness is so qualified the court must determine whether the proposed
testimony would assist the trier of fact. Pearce, 146 ldaho at 245-46, 192 P.3d at
1069-70. Applying this standard, the district court had held that Dr. Honts could
testify about the dynamics of memory, but could not testify about eyewitness
identification and lineup issues. Pearce, 146 ldaho at 246-47, 192 P.3d at 107071. The supreme court sustained this ruling, holding that the record "amply
support[edjM the conclusion that "Dr. Honts lacked academic or practical
experience specific to the area of lineup procedures." Pearce, 146 ldaho at 247,
192 P.3d at 1071.
In the present case the district court applied the correct legal standards,
and in fact did a rather extensive survey of both the ldaho cases and how courts
from various jurisdictions had addressed similar issues. (R., vol. I, pp. 161-65.)
The district court considered the relevant facts presented by this particular case.
(R., vol. I, pp. 1-2.) The court noted the limitations in applying research in the
area of eyewitness identification to real cases, noting that Dr. Malpass could only
testify in terms of "might," "possibly," and "could" when asked whether the
principles he discussed applied in this case. (R., vol. I, pp. 162-63.) Relying on

a document provided by the state in support of its motion in limine,' the court
also noted that eyewitnesses tended to be very consistent in remembering
essential details while less consistent on details that were not essential. (R., vol.

I, p. 163.) The court ultimately concluded that the reliability of the science as
applied to actual, real-life situations and the facts of this case was questionable.
(R., vol. I, p. 4.)
The court cited cases holding, in situations similar to this one, that crossexamination would be sufficient to expose for the jury any existing problems with
an eyewitness's ability to perceive and remember relevant facts. (R., vol. I, pp.
164-65.) The court agreed, and concluded, under the facts presented, that Dr.
Malpass was "no more qualified than the average juror to determine credibility of
the particular eyewitness' testimony." (R., vol. I, p. 165.)
Although in this case the district court focused more on the second prong
of the test, whether the proposed testimony would assist the trier of fact, the
same result as in Pearce is called for here. The district court understood its
discretion, understood and properly applied the relevant legal standards, and
exercised reason in making its decision. Wright argues that Dr. Malpass was
more qualified that Dr. Honts, and that the scientific information regarding
aspects of eyewitness identification is not known to lay jurors.

(Appellant's

supplemental brief, p. 8.) He makes a naked claim that his testimony would
assist the jury, but does not articulate how.

Because even Wright cannot

' The absence of this document from the record is subject to the second issue
addressed in supplemental briefing, below.
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articulate exactly how the proposed testimony would have assisted the trier of
fact, he has failed to show an abuse of discretion.

II.
The Record In This Case Is Incomwlete
The state's brief in support of its motion in limine makes specific reference
to an attachment to that brief that, it claimed, called into question the validity of
trying to apply existing research into eyewitness identification to the facts of any
specific case. (Brief in Support of State's Motion in Limine, p. 1 (exhibit to
record).) Defense counsel at the district court level specifically acknowledged
receipt of the brief and the attachment to the state's brief. (Tr., p. 9, Ls. 5-10.)
The district court specifically relied on the attachment to the state's brief for the
finding that the scientific studies on eyewitnesses showed that eyewitnesses
tended to be accurate on the "essential details," and it was the less important
details, "like the color of shoes," that tended to be inaccurate. (R., vol. I, p. 163.)
The attachment is not in the record, and therefore must be presumed to support
the district court's decision. State v. Rewici, 122 Idaho 538, 541, 835 P.2d 1349,
1352 (Ct. App. 1992).
Counsel for Wright has represented to this Court that the district court
record includes no attachment to the state's mofion in limine. (Affidavit of Justin
M. Curtis (November 12, 2008); Appellant's supplemental brief, p. 9.) This is not
surprising, as the record shows that the attachment was to the state's brief.
Counsel also speculates that the state's attachment is really among the
attachments to Wright's offer of proof. (Appellant's supplemental brief, pp. 9-10.)

This seems unlikely, as the record indicates the attachment was to the state's
brief, not the defendant's offer of proof. In addition, the defendant made specific
reference to the attachment he provided in his own briefing.

(Defendant's

Second Brief in Support of Use of Expert Testimony, p. 4 (referencing
"Attachment A ... previously submitted").)

Accepting the claim that the

defendant's attachment is really the state's attachment requires a finding at odds
with the record.
Finally, Wright argues that there never was an attachment. (Appellant's
supplemental brief, pp. 10-11 .) This argument is directly contrary to the record.
The district court specifically references the attachment and Wright's trial counsel
acknowledged that he had received both the brief and its attachment.
The attachment to the state's brief, showing at least that the scientific
research tends to show that eyewitnesses were not inaccurate as to important
matters but were instead inaccurate as to unimportant details, is not in the
record. It must be presumed to support the district court's ruling.
CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm Wright's conviction.
DATED this II th day of Decembar 2008.
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